help are discussed in Motro and Eshel 1987 . In these situations, each potential helper can wait in hope that another relative will volunteer; yet any delay decreases the efficiency of the help given to the recipient.)
The ESS model is accompanied by rigorous analysis of a simple genetic model of a one-locus, random-mating diploid population. The results of this simple genetic treatment coincide (at least in the case studied) with those of the ESS model, which is based on arguments of maximizing inclusive fitness.
IMMEDIATE MULTIPLE HELP: HAMILTON'S CONDITION FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE MIXED STRATEGY
Assume a group of n symmetrical relatives, and let r (where 0 < r < 1) be the degree of relatedness (measured by Wright's coefficient of relationship) between any two of them. We further assume that one individual in the group needs help, and that help may be given by k of the n -1 other individuals in the group (k = 0, 1, . .. , n -1). If k is greater than zero (at least one relative volunteers to help), the risk for each helper is a positive Ck, and the gain for the individual in need is bk (risk and gain measured in terms of survival probability). For convenience, we define co and bo equal to zero. Quite generally, one can assume that ftk a nonincreasing sequence and that {bk} is nondecreasing.
We consider the simple case in which the decision whether or not to offer help is made by each potential helper before information about other relatives' behavior is available. If p (where 0 ? p ? 1) is the probability of a potential helper's offering help, then we seek a value of p that is an ESS, that is, a value of p that, when adopted by a large enough part of the population, becomes advantageous in terms of inclusive fitness over any alternative strategy adopted by the minority (Maynard Smith and Price 1973) .
The concept of ESS can be directly applied to population biology only if random encounters among individuals in the population are assumed (Eshel and CavalliSforza 1982) . Then the probability of encountering a rare mutant is negligible both for a wild-type individual and for another identical mutant. Under this assumption, a necessary condition for a strategy p to be an ESS is that it must be a Nash solution of the game; namely, no mutant player that is the only mutant in its group can do better than a typical individual in a group consisting entirely of ESS players (Maynard Smith 1974) . This is apparently not the case for situations involving family structure, which is an inevitable consideration in inclusive-fitness arguments. The probability that a mutant will be encountered by another identical mutant may not be negligible even when the mutation is very rare, a difficulty ignored by many authors attempting to combine inclusive-fitness arguments with ESS techniques.
The situation is different if we concentrate on evolutionary stability against mutations of a limited probabilistic effect, namely, against all changes from p to p' where lp -p'l is small enough. Indeed, irrespective of the real (biological) cause of change, such mutations can always be interpreted as mutations having low penetrance; that is, the mutant is assumed to adopt the wild-type strategy p with probability 1 -E, whereas with a small probability e > 0 it adopts a different fixed strategy p (possibly, but not necessarily, one of the two pure strategies). If this is the case, then any individual exhibiting the new strategy p is likely to be the only one in its family group, though not necessarily the only one carrying the mutant allele. Hence, the mutant allele has an advantage if the success of a mutant strategy executed by one individual in its family group is higher, on the average, than that of a wild-type family. (Success is measured in terms of inclusive fitness.)
Note that in order to be stable against any mutant strategy, the strategy p must be stable against all mutants of limited probabilistic effect. The opposite may not, theoretically, be true. (It is true, however, for the special cases checked below by exact genetic models. For further difficulties concerning genetic analysis of inclusive-fitness arguments, see Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1978; Uyenoyama and Feldman 1981; Karlin and Matessi 1983; Matessi and Karlin 1984.) If we consider only mutations of limited probabilistic effect, and if absolute selfishness is the prevailing strategy in the population (at least for similar situations), then any mutant volunteering to help its relative is likely to be the only one in its group. Hence, the risk it takes is cl, and the gain for the relative in need is bl. The helper's net gain, in terms of inclusive fitness, is rb, -cl, and its tendency to help is likely to be selected against if this is a negative value. Consequently, we have the following result.
Result 1: The absolutely selfish strategy not to help is an ESS if rb, < c1
and only if this condition is satisfied as at least a weak inequality. This is exactly
Hamilton's condition for selfish behavior between two relatives.
However, if absolute altruism is the prevailing strategy in the population (at least for similar situations), any mutant failing to offer its help is again likely to be the only one in its group. Its gain is c,-1; the damage caused to its relative in need is bnI -bn -2; and the additional risk to each of the helpers in the group is Cn-2 -Cn-I. Thus, the net gain to the defector in terms of inclusive fitness is
Cn-I -r[bnI -bn-2 + (n -2)(Cn-2 -Cn-01-Result 2: The absolutely altruistic strategy of always helping is an ESS if r[bn-I -bn-2 + (n -2)(Cn-2 -Cn-1)] > c,_-1 (2) and only if condition (2) is satisfied as at least a weak inequality.
If n = 2, inequality (2) becomes rb, > cl, which is the converse of inequality Thus, if n = 2, the optimal strategy is always helping (if rb, > cl) or never help show, this is not the case if n > 2.
For convenience, we shall assume a few simplified forms of the risk function {Ck} and the gain function {bk}.
Assumption C1: For all k = 1, 2, . . .,n -1, Ck = c > 0 (i.e., the risk for each volunteer does not depend on the number of volunteers). This is a natural assumption when, for example, potential helpers are asked to jump into a stormy sea to save a drowning relative.
Assumption C2: For k = 1, 2, . . . , n -1, Ck = clk (where c > 0). This assumption is valid, for example, for cases in which one of k volunteers (if there are any) is chosen at random to do the risky job. This assumption is also valid when a certain amount of quantitative help is needed and each of k volunteers must provide the same fraction of that amount. Considering assumptions C1 and B3 (which we call model CI-B3), condition (2) for stability of the pure strategy of absolute altruism becomes rb > c, which is exactly the condition for instability of the pure strategy of absolute selfishness.
However, this finding is not surprising, since with these two assumptions neither the helper's risk nor its gain depends on the behavior of other individuals in the group.
For the model CI-B4, one can easily show that at least one of the pure strategies (and possibly both) is an ESS.
More interesting (and maybe more common) are situations in which helping becomes less needed as the number of helpers increases. In these situations, critiques of Hamilton's theory expect no altruism (as long as n > 2), since waiting for others to do the job is always more advantageous than volunteering. Examples for such situations are models Cl-BI, CI-B2, and C2-B2; we consider the first two For Cl-BI, condition (1) becomes r(1 -v) < c, whereas condition (2) becomes rvn -2( I-v) > c. If rv'-2(1 -v) < c < r(1 -v), then no pure strategy is an ESS. In this case, since there are only two pure strategies, we know that there must be a unique evolutionarily stable mixed strategy.
Moreover, in the special case C1-B2 for which only one helper is needed to save the relative's life, condition (2) for stability of the pure altruistic strategy is never satisfied if n is greater than 2. Hence, in this case, Hamilton's condition of r(1 -v) > c is necessary and sufficient for the evolutionary stability of a mixed strategy, characterized by a probability p (where 0 < p < 1), of helping the relative in need.
A mixed ESS cannot occur if n equals 2 (the case originally treated by Hamilton), but it appears to be quite common if n is greater than 2. As we see,
Hamilton's condition for pure altruism when n equals 2 may serve as a criterion for the existence of a mixed selfish-altruistic ESS when n is greater than 2.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY
Let the strategy of each individual in a group of relatives be denoted by a number p (where 0 c p c 1), which is the probability of this individual's choosing to help a relative in need. Let n, r, Ck, and bk also be defined as in the preceding section. If the common strategy in the population is p, the probability that there will be exactly k other volunteers is
Hence, the unconditional inclusive fitness for a volunteer is n-2 Q(p) = E fk1Tk, (7) k=O and specifically,
l(l) = -cn-I + r[bn-I -bn-2 + (n -2)(Cn-2 -Cn-1)] (9) If pure selfishness (p = 0) is the common strategy, then condition (1) We further claim that a mixed Nash solution (O < p < 1), if it exists, is an ESS if and only if the curve fl(p) intersects the p-axis from above at the point where p = .
Assume that a small fraction of the population (e > 0) adopts a strategy y > p.
The probability that a random relative will volunteer to help is p' = (1 -e)13 + ey > p. If fl(p) intersects the p-axis at p from above, then the inclusive fitness resulting from the altruistic act is fQ(p') <fQ(p) = 0. Thus, helping is disadvantageous, and p is more advantageous than y. Likewise, if y < 3, then p' < p, fQ(p') > Q~(p5) = 0, helping is advantageous, and p is again more advantageous than y.
Hence, p is an ESS.
Moreover, using the same argument, one can show that if fl(p) does not intersect the p-axis from above (at p), then p is not an ESS.
If we consider assumption Cl (constant risk for the helper), equation (7) be-
Ql(p)= -c + r 3 (l k )Pk(l -P)nl2k (bk+ I -bk)* (10) Thus, for the constant-risk additive-benefit model C1-B3, we get (not surprisingly)
l(p)= -c + rb, (11) which is either always positive or always negative, depending only on Hamilton's condition. (Indeed, this is a degenerate case of multiple help, since neither the helper's risk nor its gain depends on the number of other helpers.)
If superadditivity of benefit is assumed (model CI-B4), then fQ(p) is an increasin function of p. Hence, depending on the parameters, helping can be either always disadvantageous or always advantageous, or (for a nondegenerate set of parameters) it can be advantageous only if p, the tendency of other individuals to help, is large enough. No mixed ESS can exist in this model. The same results are obtained for the models C2-B3 and C2-B4. (Note the similarity of these results with those obtained by Cohen and Eshel [1976] , who did not use any kin-selection arguments. For a prediction of such a similarity between compatible models of kin selection and group selection, see Matessi and Jayakar 1976.) We find it more interesting, however, to lose some generality and concentrate on the situation that has originally motivated this work, namely, the model C -B
In this case, the need for one's help decreases as the number of other helpers increases, but the cost of altruism remains the same. A special case is model Cl-B2, in which the help of a single helper is sufficient and the advantage of having someone else do the job is obvious.
Under Cl-Bl, equation (6) becomes
which is a decreasing function of p. We already know from result 3 that in this model only one pure strategy, at most, can be an ESS. If rv -2(1 -v) < c < r(1 -v), no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable and a single mixed ESS exists, which is the solution of fl(p,) = 0, namely,
Thus, J increases with r and decreases with c and n. Indeed, J tends to zero as n approaches infinity, not a surprising finding, since it agrees with both daily experience and documented results in the social sciences.
Less obvious is how the number of potential helpers affects the chances of the individual in need of being saved.
If Hamilton's condition for help between two relatives does not hold (i.e., if r(1 -v) is smaller than c), the ESS is the pure selfish strategy. Hence, the probability of getting help is zero, independent of the number of potential helpers.
If Hamilton's condition holds, we discern between two possibilities. If, on the one hand,
(n is larger than 2, since both v and c/r(1 -v) are less than one), then rvn-2(1 -v) -c and p = 1; hence, the probability of getting efficient help is Fn = 1 -vn, (14) which is an increasing function of n.
If, on the other hand, n is greater than n, then j is given by equation (13) and we
which is a decreasing function of n.
The probability of getting help is, therefore, maximal for some "optimal" group size n*, which is either [n] or [n] + 1. It tends to the positive value 1 -c/r(1 -v) as n approaches infinity. For the possible effect of such an argument on the evolution of family (or group) size in nature, the reader is referred to Parker and Hammerstein (1985) . Note, however, that in their (quite different) model, the smaller the group size, the larger the chance of getting help. In the present model, the optimal group size, n*, increases from 2 to infinity as v increases from 0 to 1 or as c decreases from r(1 -v) to 0.
In the special case Cl-B2, where v equals 0, the condition rvn-2(1 -v) ? c for pure altruism is never satisfied when n is larger than 2, and Hamilton's condition is then a necessary and a sufficient condition for a mixed strategy. In this case, the probability Fn of getting efficient help decreases from 1 when n = 2 to 1 -clr as n approaches infinity.
Since risk and gain are frequency-dependent for each helper, a generalized Hamilton's rule can be defined, which considers the expected value of rb -c. Consider a diploid population and broods of a fixed size, n. An available sib will volunteer and help its brother in need according to its genetically determined, single-locus strategy.
Let AA be the wild type and let p be the probability that an individual of this type will help its sib in need. Let a be a rare mutation; Aa individuals have probability y #A p of helping the sib in need.
Note that in the kin-selection models of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1978) and of Uyenoyama and Feldman (1980, 1981) We consider the model CI-B 1, treated in the preceding section. A typical consists of AA individuals exclusively. For any one of them (call it I), the probability of being the one in need is 1/n, and it has a probability [lI -p(lv)]'" -1 of not getting efficient help and therefore dying. If someone else needs help (the probability of that event is 1 -1/n), the probability that 1 will volunteer is p and the probability that I dies in its attempt to help is c. Hence, for any sib in the brood, the probability of dying is 1 -wl = [1 -p(l -v)]"-'n + (1 -1/n)pc. (16) If the frequency e > 0 of allele a is small enough, the viability of a random AA individual is w1 + o(E). The rare allele a is usually carried (with probability 1 -o(E)) by a heterozygote Aa, which is an offspring of a mating of AA and Aa. The probability that Aa will have exactly k Aa brothers (and n -1 -k AA brothers) is (ak1) 1/2-1. Hence, the probability that an individual of type Aa will die either from a lack of help or in an attempt to help a sib is
The viability of a random Aa is W2 + o(E). Natural selection operates for Aa, when it is rare, if wx < W2, and against Aa when wx > W2. But W2(P) = w1, and a (13), if 1/2v-'(1 -v) < c < ?/2(1 -v). This ESS has the property of evolutionary genetic stability (EGS; see Eshel and Feldman 1982; Eshel 1985) . It is the only strategy that, when fixed in the population, is immune to any mutation that determines a different tendency to help. Moreover, if the population is fixed on a different strategy, that strategy is always unstable with respect to mutations that determine (at least in a heterozygous form) a strategy slightly closer to EGS.
MULTIPLE HELP WITH A RANDOM NUMBER OF HELPERS: THE ESS MODEL
In the previous sections, we assumed that the number of potential helpers is constant (n -1, where n is the group size). The analysis remains virtually intact if the number of potential helpers changes from one situation to another, provided that each time every potential helper is fully aware of that number. The ESS then determines different helping probabilities for different situations, depending not only on the risk, c, but also on the actual number of potential helpers.
In this section, we consider a situation in which the number of potential helpers (e.g., the number of relatives hearing the cry for help) is a random variable, X. The decision by each of them to provide help or not must be made before any information on X is available to the potential helper.
More specifically, we assume that the group of potential helpers is drawn at random from a larger population of relatives, that each relative has the same chance of being included in that group (not necessarily independently of others), and that the size of the group, X, in each situation is independent of past events.
Let P(X = n) = ran (n = 0, 1, 2, . . .) be the probability that the number of potential helpers is n, and let +(s) denote the generating function of X such that 00 +(s) = E(sX) = 3 1TSn n =O heavily depends on the number of potential helpers present. In the situation analyzed here, however, the only information available to the decision maker is the probability distribution of the number of potential helpers, X, and the realization of the event E that the decision maker itself belongs to that group. But from the assumption that any individual in the larger population of relatives has the same probability of being included in the random group of potential helpers, it immediately follows that the a priori probability that one belongs to such a group is proportional to the group size n, say, On. Hence, 00 P(X = nIE) = OnP(X = n) E OkP(X = k) = nirl/E(X). The inclusive fitness fl(p) is a decreasing function of p, which means that the higher the willingness of others to help, the less advantageous it is for an individual to volunteer. Consequently, the system maintains one and only one ESS, either pure or mixed.
Result 5: (a) Hamilton's condition that c < r(1 -v) is, in this case, a necessary and sufficient condition for having some altruistic behavior (i.e., for having the ESS j > 0). (20) fQ(p) = -c + r(1 -v)e-xP(lv)
The condition for full altruism is
If A approaches infinity (i.e., the population of relatives is dense), the right-hand side of equation (21) tends to zero and the condition for full altruism is never satisfied. If, however, A approaches zero (i.e., the population of relatives is sparse), equation (21) which is an increasing function of X. This result is identical to that obtained by Boorman and Levitt (1980) in their "one-one" combinatorial model.
(c) If the relatives' population is dense (i.e., if X > X*), the ESS is mixed. It is a decreasing function of X, tending to zero as X approaches infinity.
need will get help does not change with X. This result differs from that obtained for a fixed number of potential helpers in the above "Analysis of the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy." In that case, the probability of getting help is a decreasing function of the number of potential helpers (which, as it increases, tends to a limit that is exactly F of eq. 23).
MULTIPLE HELP WITH A RANDOM NUMBER OF HELPERS: A SIMPLE GENETIC MODEL
Assume a diploid population divided into large groups (each of size N + 1) of relatives. Let r be the degree of relatedness between any two individuals in a group, and assume that mating is random between individuals belonging to different groups. Suppose that in each generation exactly one individual in each group needs help. Let p (p << 1) be the probability that any other individual in the group is available when needed. Thus, the number of available helpers is, approximately, Poisson-distributed with X = Np. We consider model C1-BI and a that X is not smaller than X* of the preceding section.
We further assume that the tendency to help is genetically determined by a single locus, which has a common allele A and a rare mutation a (at a small but positive frequency, E > 0). Let p be the probability that an available AA individual will help its relative in need, and let y 7& p be that strategy for Aa.
A random AA individual has relatives of type AA with probability 1 -o(E).
If this individual is the one who needs help (the probability of that event is 1/[N + 1]), then its probability of not getting efficient help and dying is 00 > e-X" [1 -p(l -v)]n/n! + 0(E) = e-XP(l-v) + o(E). n=O The probability that this individual will lose its life while helping a relative in need is ppc. Hence, the death probability of AA is
A random Aa individual comes from a group in which the proportion of AA's is, approximately, 1 -r and the proportion of Aa's is r. (Here we used both the assumption of random mating and the assumption of large groups of r relatives.) If Aa needs help, it will die because of lack of help with probability 
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Employing analysis similar to that for sib-sib multiple help, we arrive at the following result.
Result 7: The ESS probability 5, defined in equation (22), has the property of evolutionary genetic stability (see result 4).
MULTIPLE HELP WITH REPETITION AND THE EVOLUTION
OF RECIPROCAL-LIKE ALTRUISM Trivers (1971) was the first to suggest that reciprocation provided the basis for the evolution of altruism. If encounters are frequent enough, then helping an individual in trouble may be advantageous to the donor in the long run, provided that the recipient tends to repay kindness in kind once its help is needed. The possibility of future encounters can also increase the level of mutual help established between relatives to a higher degree than expected because of their respective relatedness Eshel and Motro 1981) . This higher level Assume now that for each individual in the population there is a small probability ox that it will be the next one to need help (in a similar future situation). The death of a relative in the present situation entails a small decrease in the expected number of potential helpers in the future, from pN = X to p(N -1) = A -p (using the same notation as in the preceding section). Consequently, if p, the tendency in the population to help a relative, is 0 c p c 1, the death of a relative increases the death probability of an individual in need from exp( -Ap) to exp[ -(A -p)p]. The probability that an individual will die in helping any of its relatives in the future remains oppc. Hence, the probability of death while helping in a future situation decreases, with the death of the individual in need at the present situation, from Notppc to (N -l)xppc. Thus, with the death of the relative in need, the probability of death for each of the N remaining individuals increases by ot(e-(X-P)P -e-XP) -[oXtpc -ox(X -p)pc] otpp(eP -c). The total loss to I (in terms of inclusive fitness) due to its own death is y = 1 + rNo pp(e -XP -c) .
Under the assumption C1-B2, if I volunteers to help, the survival probability of the individual in need increases from 1 -e -(X -P)P to 1, while I has a probability c of losing its life in that act. Hence, the inclusive fitness of 1, if it volunteers, is Q(P) = e-(Xp-PI -cy eX-P 3 -c (24) -c + re -P + opp(eX-P -c)[(l -r)eX-P + rN(eX-P -c)].
As an immediate result, Hamilton's condition for the stability of p = 0 (full selfishness) remains unchanged; r < c. (Indeed, if nobody helps, there is no point in saving someone else's life in the hope that that individual will save your life or your relative's life in the future.)
If, however, a mixed ESS, pa, exists (where 0 < pc < 1), then fj(pj) = 0 and a(p)alapip=p < 0 (see "Analysis of the ESS"). From equation (24) it is clear that if flO(p) = 0, then exp(-Ap) -c > 0 (and rexp(-Ap) -c < 0). Hence, by using the implicit-function theorem, we get dp,ldot > 0.
Result 8: If not zero, the evolutionarily stable probability of altruism is an increasing function of ox, the probability of a need for help in the future.
Our analysis of mutual help with repetition between two individuals (Eshel and Motro 1981) Hence, for sufficiently large X, fl(po) is greater than zero. Thus, either fl(p) intersects the p-axis from above at some point p 1 (Po < p 1 --1) or fl(p) is great than zero for all po < p c 1. In the first case, p I is a positive ESS, whereas p = I is an ESS in the second case. In both cases, if r < c, p = 0 is also an ESS.
The possibility of more than one ESS distinguishes the case of multiple help with repetition from the case without repetition. In the latter case, fQ(p) is a decreasing function of p, which entails the existence of only a single ESS.
A case of special interest is that of mutual help among nonrelatives. Putting r = 0 in equation (24) Hence, full altruism can also be an ESS.
If c < exp( -X), then f' (1) < 0 and fJ(1) > fQO(O). Thus, there exists p 1) for which fLt(p) obtains its maximal value. By choosing c small enough (but not too small), we can get f1(jp) > 0 and fJ(1) < 0. Hence, there is a value j5 (j < j < 1) for which ft(p) intersects the p-axis from above. Thus, j is a mixed ESS.
Using the implicit-function theorem, we get that j is an increasing function of cx and p and a decreasing function of c and X.
Result 9: The evolutionarily stable probability of altruism within a group of nonrelatives is an increasing function of ox, the probability of future need, and of p, the probability that a group member will be available when needed. As expected, the ESS is a decreasing function of the risk, c, but, quite interestingly, it is also a decreasing function of X, the parameter that reflects the intensity of meetings within the group. Since X equals Np, the ESS is indeed a decreasing function of group size; but however big the group is, altruism can be maintained, provided that c is small enough.
DISCUSSION
The possibility that an individual in trouble can be saved by each of several relatives has long been considered a criticism of Hamilton's theory of kin selection. The criticism arises because if Hamilton's condition for altruism between two relatives is fulfilled, any potential helper can always benefit from leaving the risky task of saving the individual in need to any of its other relatives. Hence, since desertion is advantageous, it seems that selfish behavior will always prevail in such situations.
As shown in this paper, the weakness of this argument lies in its ignoring the possibility of mixed strategies. Indeed, if Hamilton's condition for altruism between two relatives is not satisfied, full selfishness is also the only evolutionarily stable strategy for the case of more than one potential helper. However, the fulfillment of Hamilton's condition in the one-to-one situation implies, in the multiple-help case, the evolutionary stability of a mixed strategy of altruism and selfishness, that is, of a strategy by which help is provided only with a certain positive probability.
As expected, the evolutionarily stable probability of altruism increases with the degree of relatedness, it decreases as a function of the risk involved in providing the necessary help, and it also decreases as a function of the number of potential helpers (it tends to zero as the number of potential helpers tends to infinity). If
Hamilton's condition holds and if the population is fixed on the ESS, the probability that the individual in need will be saved is maximal for a certain group size.
Unlike the evolutionarily stable probability of providing help, the probability of getting help does not tend to zero as the number of potential helpers tends to infinity.
If a situation in which an individual needs help can be repeated in the future (in such a way that each group member has the same small chance of being the next one to need help), the evolutionarily stable probability of altruism increases as the chance of future repetition increases. In this case, a positive evolutionarily stable probability of altruism can exist even among nonrelatives. The existence of mutual help in a group of nonrelatives requires neither any tendency for gratitude among group members nor any memory or ability to distinguish between group members (though they must recognize a group member as such). Note, however, that if Hamilton's condition for one-to-one altruism does not hold, then even if some positive probability of altruism is evolutionarily stable, full selfishness is always stable. One must still consider how (and whether) a population (or a group) can evolve from the selfish evolutionarily stable state into the (at least partly) altruistic state (see, e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) .
SUMMARY
In situations involving a single relative in distress and several potential helpers, the advantage of leaving the risky job of aiding the relative in need to any of the other potential helpers is quite obvious. Hence, even if Hamilton's condition for altruism in the one-to-one situation is satisfied, it might seem that altruistic behavior would not evolve if there is more than one potential helper.
In this paper we investigate the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of helping behavior in situations involving several potential helpers and a necessarily instantaneous response. The main result is that if Hamilton's condition is met, the ESS is usually a mixed strategy of altruism and selfishness, with a decreasing (yet positive) probability of helping as the number of potential helpers increases.
